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INTRODUCTION
It has been argued that strong urban economies are the backbone and motor of the wealth of nations (Jacobs (1984) ). As countries become more reliant on manufacturing and services and less on agriculture, urban areas are more likley to become important for fostering marshallian externalities, nourishing innovation, providing a hub for trade, and encouraging human capital accumulation. Such economies should be particularly important for developing countries since trends in urbanization show that the share of the urban population has increased substantially in these since the 1950s. For example, between 1950 and 2000 urbanization, defined as the share of urban to total population, increased by 124 per cent in developing countries compared to 38 per cent in the industrialized world (United Nations (2002)), so that the gap in relative size of the urban population between developing and developed countries has narrowed substantially. 1 At the same time one has not witnessed a similar convergence in economic growth rates between these two groups. Although this discrepancy between the rates of urbanization and economic growth rates in developing countries has long been recognized, it has only recently again come strongly under the limelight; see, the 2000 World Bank Report. 2 The traditional debate on the link between urbanization and economic development in developing nations focused on whether urbanization was 'too' high; see, for instance, Davis and Golden (1954) , Sovani (1964) , Kamerschen (1969) and Gugler (1982) for early discussions. Those subscribing to the over-urbanization hypothesis argued that developing countries' rates of urbanization are higher than that of today's developed nations compared to when these were at the same stage of development (i.e. in the 19 th century) and hence are above their optimum level. 3 In contrast, opponents of this view have questioned the implicit assumption underlying this 'over-urbanization' hypothesis that the course of industrialization and urbanization in developing countries should conform to the path taken by today's industrialized countries. Instead, it has been argued that a more satisfactory approach would require analyzing whether less urbanization in 1 Urbanization was three times higher in developed countries in the 1950s, whereas now it is less than double that of developing countries. 2 See Chapter 6, "Dynamic Cities as Engines of Growth". 3 Kamerschen (1969) defines over-urbanization as follows: "Countries in the early stages of industrialization suffer an imbalance in both the size and distribution of their urban populations, implying primarily that they have a higher percentage of people living in cities and towns than is "warranted" at their stage of economic development. The term used to describe this phenomenon is 'over-urbanization' ".
2 developing countries would have indeed favored greater growth and development.
Although important, this traditional debate has probably missed an essential point, namely to take account of the distribution of the population across cities, i.e., the degree of urban concentration. As a matter of fact, there is a large literature that demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that there are increasing returns at the city level, thus suggesting that urban concentration may be more important than urbanization per se; see Duranton and Puga (2004) for a theoretical survey on the micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a review of the empirical evidence. Examining patterns of urban concentration in developing countries, one finds that, along side increases in urbanization, developing countries have also experienced sizeable growth rates of urban concentration over the last fifty years.
Specifically, whereas the growth of large cities (more than 5 million inhabitants) has been slow or even zero in the industrialized world, developing nations are experiencing ever greater population concentration in large urban agglomerations and in mega-cities (defined as cities with a population greater than 10 million). For example, between 1975 and 2000 the number of mega-cities increased from 3 to 15 in developing countries, compared to a rise from 2 to 4 in developed countries (United Nations (2002)).
In seeking econometric evidence, one discovers only a few econometric studies that have attempted to highlight the impact of urbanization or urban concentration on economic development. Moomaw and Shatter (1993) regress different measures of urbanization and urban concentration on growth and find that metropolitan concentration has a positive while urban primacy, defined as concentration of urban population in the largest city, has a negative impact. McCoskey and Kao (1998) using panel cointegration techniques find that long-run effects of urbanization on growth cannot be rejected. More recently, Henderson (2003) has identified a non-monotonous impact of urban primacy on economic development, thus suggesting a (broad) range of values of optimal primacy levels, below which urban concentration fosters rather than deters economic development.
One criticism that could be cast against most of the econometric findings in the studies just mentioned is their failure to distinguish between developed and developing countries. There are, however, two compelling arguments for examining developing 3 countries separately. Firstly, developing and developed countries may be on different paths of development (see, for instance, Mankiw et al. (1992) and Quah (1996) concentration would reduce growth for about a third of the countries in our sample. In contrast we find that urbanization has no straightforward link to economic development.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we describe our specification and our estimation method. Section III contains a description of our data and provides 4 some summary statistics. Our empirical results are given and discussed in Section IV.
The final section contains concluding remarks.
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
To estimate the impact of urbanization and urban concentration on growth we follow Henderson (2003) and assume that there are only two factors of production, physical capital (K it ) and labor (L it ) so that the production function is given by:
where Y it is the flow of output produced in country i at time t. The production function also depends on A it , to reflect the effects of technological progress. Assuming a CobbDouglas constant returns to scale technology, first differencing and normalizing by labor, the production function in (1) becomes:
where lower case letters are the variables under scrutiny relative to labor, α is the distribution parameter of capital, and ∆loga stands for productivity growth. 5 Productivity growth is modeled as a function of urban distribution as well as the level of human capital, democracy, and time and country fixed effects. 6 This leaves us with the following specification:
where Z' represents the vector for our control variables and X is the urbanization/urban concentration measure, our variable of interest.
One should note that in (3) we have not restricted X to have a linear impact on the dependent variable. There are at least two good reasons to account for potential nonlinearities when it comes to analyzing the impact of urbanization/urban concentration on growth. First, urbanization as well as urban concentration variables are bounded from above and below, and may even just mechanically affect growth differently near their bounds compared to the mid-values. Second, using urban primacy as a measure of the X 5 Subscripts for time are not shown for simplicity of presentation. 6 To control for time specific effect and country time-invariant specific effects we included time and country dummies. 5 variable, Henderson (2003) has provided evidence of a parabolic relationship between X and the dependent variable in his study using a sample including both developing and developed countries. Here, rather than including squared values of X to restrict the nonlinearity to be of a particular form in a similar manner to Henderson (2003) , we opt for a much more flexible approach to modeling the potential non-linearity. Specifically, we use the semi-parametric Kernel regression estimator proposed by Robinson (1988) , which does not restrict the non-linearity to take on any specific functional form, but still allows the use of other conditioning variables. 7
One can consider the following equation to be estimated:
where 
such that i=1…n are the n number of observations, K h () is the shape function, commonly referred to as the Kernel, that is a continuous, bounded and real function that integrates to one and acts as a weighting function of observations around X and depends on the choice of bandwith h. The appeal of this estimator lies in its very flexible approach to non-linearity by allowing the relationship of ỹ with respect to X to vary over all values of X. Specifically, this technique corresponds to estimating the regression function at a particular point by locally fitting constants to the data via weighted least squares, where those observations closer to the chosen point have more influence on the regression estimate than those further away, as determined by the choice of h and K. An additional 6 appeal of this sort of technique is that it avoids any parametric assumptions regarding the conditional mean function m(X), and thus about its functional form or error structure.
Allowing for the linear effect of other explanatory variables only slightly complicates the estimation of g(X). Specifically, Robinson (1988) showed that in controlling for other conditioning variables the (semi-parametric) Kernel regression estimator for g(X)
simply becomes: 9 
where ε is a random error term. Intuitively, ( ) X ĝ is the estimate of g(X) after the independent effect(s) of Z on Y has been removed.
Given that the estimate of ( ) X ĝ is at least in part based on non-parametric estimation techniques, one cannot subject it to the standard statistical type tests (e.g. t-test) that economists have grown so accustomed to using in parametric regressions. One can, however, relatively easily calculate upper and lower pointwise confidence bands as: 10
where c α c K is a kernel specific constant corresponding to the α quantile of the distribution and ( )
7 One should note that (6) ignores the possible approximation error bias of ( )
Including this in (6) would complicate the expression considerably since the bias is a complicated function of the first and second derivatives of g(X). This bias tends to be highest at sudden peaks of ( )
and at the necessarily truncated left and right boundaries of the data. However, if h is chosen proportional to 1/n (1/5) times a sequence that tends slowly to zero then the bias vanishes asymptotically for the interior points. 11
For all our estimations we use a Gaussian kernel for K h and an optimal bandwidth h such that:
where
One should also note that the size of ( )
at any point of X will depend proportionally on the marginal distribution of X. In other words the accuracy of the estimate of g(X) at X is positively related to the density of other observations around that point. In order to visualize this effect we, as suggested by Haerdle (1990) Haerdle (1990) and Wand and Jones (1995) for a discussion of these aspects. 12 From the endpoints we chose the 1 and 99 percentiles of the distribution. 13 Further details as well as sources on other variables that were used are provided in the appendix. Our source for constructing our various measures of X is the 2001 Revision of the UN World Urbanization Prospects data. As mentioned earlier, for externalities to arise it may not be urbanization per se, but rather the variation in the population distribution across urban areas that is important. Hence our main focus will be on measures of urban concentration rather than urbanization, although we do, for completeness sake, also report results for this latter measure. Specifically, we use two measures of urban concentration in our estimations. First, we utilize a measure of primacy, defined as the share of urban population living in the largest city. This has been used by Henderson (2003) , for instance. Primacy may, however, not be a satisfactory measure when there are huge differences between country sizes. In small countries or areas it is common for the quasi-totality of the urban population to be concentrated in a single city. Extreme cases, where primate cities account for or close to 100 per cent of the urban population include Hong Kong, Kuwait City, Singapore, Gaza City. These cases, clearly being outliers, were not considered in our final data set.
However, there are often cities other than the largest city that account for large proportions of the urban population. Thus using primacy as a measure of urban concentration results in attributing low values to countries like India which has many large cities, but tends to be very large for small countries. Furthermore, changes in primacy do not always reflect overall changes in the total population. In particular, whereas the share of the largest city's population often decreased as a consequence of increasing urbanization, urban concentration increased due to a more than proportional increase in medium and large agglomerations. We thus propose also using an alternative measures, which we term urban density, rather than primacy as a measure of the urban concentration. This measure of urban density is defined as the share of the urban population living in cities larger than 750,000 inhabitants. 14 9
All in all our data sources provide us with the necessary information for continuous observations for 6 five-year periods over the years 1960-1990 on 39 countries.
Summary statistics for our measures of X are given in Table 1 . First of all it is apparent that there is a reasonable amount of variation in our data for our three measures.
Eyeballing the raw data would reveal that this variation is both due to cross-country and within country changes. 15 More importantly, the low correlation coefficients across all three measures suggest that they capture different aspects of the urban phenomenon.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Urban Concentration
Since our semi-parametric methodology allows the link between economic growth and our urban variable to vary over the entire observed range of urban concentration/urbanization, results are, as is standard when using this estimator, depicted graphically. As stated earlier, this also allows one to link the statistical accuracy of the results with confidence bands and the distribution of observations. More precisely, single depicted points below and above the continuous line constitute lower and upper confidence bands. The horizontal distance between each set of confidence points on the confidence bands indicates the distribution of the observations across the indicated range of X, where five per cent of the sample lie between each set of points. One should also note that we do not report the actual estimates of g(X) on the vertical axes, just graph the relationship between X and the dependent variable. Our primary reason for not reporting these is that our estimates of g(X) are predicted values from which the influence of the other control variables have been purged, and hence, cannot be directly linked to the actual range of observed ỹ . Moreover, the predicted absolute levels of g(X) cannot be 15 The mean standard deviation within countries across time is equal to 0.05, 0.03, and 0.03 for urbanization, primacy, and urban concentration, respectively. In Figure 1 we first graph our estimates of g(X) using urban density. As can be seen, while the general shape suggests a U-shaped relationship between urban concentration and growth, this link is not very smooth near either end of the curve. However, as can be gauged from the horizontal distance between the confidence band points at the ends, our estimate of g(X) in these areas is based on relatively few observations. For example, only one per cent of the observations lie between the last set of confidence band points and the end of the curve. 16 Both of these factors would tend to make our estimates around this area relatively inaccurate.
16 One has to, however, keep in mind that, in contrast to the endpoints, the horizontal distance between all other confidence band points indicates that five per cent of the sample lie within the observed range. 
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We can use these results to separate our sample into countries that are on the left or right side of the turning point value of urban density, which is estimated to be 0.36, according to their actual observed level of urban density at the beginning and end of the sample period, 1960 and 1990 . This is shown in the first two columns of Table 2 . Accordingly, in 1960 12 of our 39 countries had urban density levels below the threshold value and thus were in an urban-concentration trap. This figure was only reduced by 1 by 1990, although comparison across time for individual countries reveals that there was more movement across categories than the aggregate numbers suggest. In particular, while the urban density in Indonesia and Tunisia fell to such an extent that these two countries fell into the urban-concentration trap, growth in urban density pushed El Salvador, Myanmar, and Nicaragua into the upward sloping part of the estimated curve.
In Figure 2 , the relationship between urban primacy and growth is depicted. Again, a Ushaped curve, but much smoother than for the case of urban density, is apparent.
Specifically using this semi-parametric estimate suggests that there is a negative relationship between primacy and growth, up until primal cities have less than 41 per cent of the urban population (compared to 36 per cent for the urban concentration case), countries. Thus any optimal urban concentration levels will not be driven by already developed nations. For example, in the bell-shaped curve found by Henderson (2003) using parametric estimators of the effect of first and second order terms of primacy on growth, mostly high income countries are driving the left hand side of the curve.
Urbanization
So far, we have focused our attention on urban concentration measures rather than urbanization. There are, however, some studies that have attempted to link urbanization and output, as, for instance, McCoskey and Kao (1998) . Starting from a
Cobb-Douglas production function framework using non-stationary panel data techniques, these authors try to highlight the link between urbanization and output at the country level, accounting explicitly for developed and developing countries.
Although novel, their approach leads to mixed results, in particular when estimating average effects. One should also note that they do not consider non-linear effects in their framework. Moreover, we, in contrast, concentrate specifically on urban concentration measures as urbanization may be correlated with the general level of development. However, when it comes to capturing externalities related to the size of cities, the distribution rather than the share of urban population is arguably the relevant variable. Indeed, in our sample of LDCs, rural population is strongly negatively correlated with urban population (-0.93), hinting at the fact that urbanization may actually convey information on the industrial structure of a country, i.e., the distribution of agricultural vs. non-agricultural activities. Nevertheless we estimated (3) using urbanization, the results of which are shown in Figure 3 . As can be seen, there is no clear relationship between urbanization and growth, a result consistent with the finding of McCoskey and Kao (1998).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The central feature that can be deduced from our analysis is the existence in developing countries of a threshold value below which marginal increases in urban concentration would deter and above which would foster growth. In contrast, we find no systematic relationship between economic growth and urbanization. Thus our result suggests that the traditional question of whether developing countries are over-urbanized or not is probably ill-posed. What matters is not urbanization per se, but urban hierarchies, i.e.,
how the urban population is distributed among cities. Urbanization may instead simply Finally, we are careful to point out that one must be cautious in terms of the policy implications of our result. In particular, our analysis only measures the net macroeconomic impact across an observed range of levels of urban concentration, but does not address the costs individual city dwellers typically incur living in large metropolitan areas in developing countries, such as over-crowding, poor sanitary conditions, and deficient infrastructure. Clearly further research is required in order to derive any conclusion regarding an optimal policy package.
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